Abstract. We show how to express an arbitrary integer interval
Introduction
New Result in Additive Combinatorics. The principal contribution of this paper is to show that for any integer interval I = [0, H] and any 1 < u < H, there is a sumsetrepresentation
for some ≤ log u (H + 1) and H ∈ [1, u − 2], where b * A = {ba : a ∈ A} and A + B = {a + b : a ∈ A ∧ b ∈ B}. We first derive a recursive formula for computing G j for any u > 1. As an interesting technical contribution, we then show a semiclosed form for G j , that is, we show how to compute G j given only H, j and u. This algorithm is efficient and only requires simple arithmetic. More precisely, we show that G j is equal to the sum of H/u j+1 and a simple (but non-trivial) function of the j + 1 lowest u-ary digits of H. We think that the presented algorithm may be interesting by itself say in the general context of additive combinatorics [TV06] : decompositions of sets as sumsets are common in additive combinatorics, but our concrete result differs significantly from existing results in that field.
Corrected some small typos. The most annoying of them was that we had typos in the definition of hj+ and [[x]] on page 6.
Range Proof: Background. We are now going to apply Eq. (1) in cryptography, more precisely in the construction of cryptographic range proofs. In a cryptographic range proof, the prover proves in zero knowledge that for given C and H, C is a commitment of some element σ ∈ [0, H]. (Modifying it to general ranges [L, H] is trivial when one uses a homomorphic commitment scheme.) Range proofs are needed in various applications like e-voting [DJ01] , e-auctions [LAN02] , e-cash, etc. Range proofs with communication complexity O(1) were introduced in [Bou00, Lip03] . However, such proofs work under very specific security assumptions, and thus there is still interest in protocols that are based on the discrete logarithm scenario. There exists a well-known folklore cryptographic range proof, see for example [DJ01] , in the special case when H = u − 1 for some integers u, > 0. In this protocol, the prover writes σ as σ = σ j u j , commits-by using a homomorphic commitment scheme-to all values σ j , and then proves in zero-knowledge (using say a Σ-protocol) that σ j ∈ [0, u − 1] for all j. The folklore protocol is most efficient in the case u = 2, and thus this case has been studied the most. (For larger u, one has to use recursive range proofs for every σ j .) Notice, however, that the communication complexity of this folklore range proof is Θ(log H).
Recently, Camenisch, Chaabouni and Shelat [CCS08] presented a new range proof that works in the non-binary case. Assuming again H = u − 1, the verifier in their range proof first publishes signatures on all integers in [0, u − 1]. The prover gives a proof of knowledge on signatures of committed elements σ j . Analogously to the folklore protocol, this shows that the prover knows elements σ j ∈ [0, u − 1] such that σ = σ j u j (the latter part is trivial with a public homomorphic commitment to σ). However, if H = u −1 then both the folklore protocol and the protocol of [CCS08] get more complicated, and require up to 2 times more communication. (In a nutshell, this is because they show that σ ∈ [0, H] by using an AND composition of two range proofs of form σ ∈ [0, u − 1].) In the special case u = 2, an efficient modification of the folklore case for general ranges was proposed (though its correctness was not proven) in [LAN02] . There it was noted that for any H ≥ 1, σ ∈ [0, H] if and only if σ = log 2 H j=0 G j σ j , where σ j ∈ {0, 1} and G j := (H + 2 j )/2 j+1 . For example, σ ∈ [0, 11] iff σ = 6σ 0 + 3σ 1 + σ 2 + σ 3 for σ j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus the folklore protocol can be extended to arbitrary values of H with virtually no efficiency loss. In the language of additive combinatorics, the result of [LAN02] says that
Note that Eq. (2) does not straightforwardly generalize to the case where we are interested in a larger range [0, u − 1]. In fact, [LAN02] did not even present a proof that Eq. (2) holds. As a straightforward corollary of our sumset-representation of [0, H], we obtain a proof that the presentation of Eq. (2) is correct.
Application of the Sumset-Representation in Range Proofs. We show how to use the sumset-representation Eq.
(1) to modify the range proof of [CCS08] so that it will become at least 50% more communication-efficient in practice (and so that it is always more efficient than the folklore protocol). For this we use a simple corollary of our general sumset-representation that [0,
Moreover, if we set u = O(log H/ log log H), then the total communication of the range proof is Θ(log H/ log log H). We also point out some mistakes in [CCS08] , namely, that the so called OR composition proposed there does not work in most of the cases, and thus their protocols are somewhat less efficient than claimed. Finally, our secondary contribution is an implicit framework for generating range proofs. Recall that when the group order is hidden (e.g., in RSA-like settings), earlier range protocols [Lip03] exploit the quadratic form
to represent any positive integer. Since there is a 4-term quadratic form, range proofs in this setting have constant size. As discussed below, this idea does not help when the group order is known (e.g. under discrete-log like assumptions). Nonetheless, finding more efficient linear or quadratic forms for ranges [0, H], in which each term is in a small range will immediately lead to more efficient range proofs in the discrete logarithm setting.
Preliminaries
We summarize and copy some of the notation and definitions from [CCS08] for consistency and to make it easier for the reader to follow.
Notation. PPT means probabilistic polynomial-time. k is the security parameter. In all protocols, prover and verifier send elements from G 1 , G T and Z p . We denote the length of representation (which may differ from the logarithm of the cardinality of the groups) of such elements by replen(G 1 ), replen(G T ) and replen(Z p ) respectively. The Gen algorithm generates parameters p for a scheme. The Com algorithm runs on input (p, m, r) where m is a string, and r is a random tape, and produces a pair of values (c, o) representing the committed string and an opening string. The Open algorithm runs on input (c, m, o) and outputs 0 or 1. The scheme should have a "hiding" property and a "binding" property which informally require it to be difficult (or impossible) for the adversary to determine the message m from c or to open the value of a commitment c to two different messages m 1 , m 2 .
Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Σ-Protocols. We use definitions from [BG92, CDM00] . A pair of interacting algorithms (P, V) is a proof of knowledge (PK) for a relation R = {(α, β)} ⊆ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * with knowledge error κ ∈ [0, 1] if (1) for all (α, β) ∈ R, V(α) accepts a conversation with P(β) with probability 1; and (2) there exists an expected polynomial-time algorithm E, called the knowledge extractor, such that if a cheating prover P * has probability of convincing V to accept α, then E, when given rewindable black-box access to P * , outputs a witness β for α with probability − κ.
A proof system (P, V) is computational honest-verifier zero-knowledge if there exists a PPT algorithm Sim, called the simulator, such that for any (α, β) ∈ R, the outputs of V (α) after interacting with P(β) and that of Sim(α) are computationally indistinguishable. When we will talk about honest-verifier zero-knowledge we will assume the computational case.
Note that standard techniques can be used to transform an honest-verifier zeroknowledge proof system into a general zero-knowledge one [CDM00] . This is especially true of special Σ-protocols that will be presented later in the paper. Thus, for the remainder of the paper, our proofs will be honest-verifier zero-knowledge. (This also allows us to make more accurate comparisons with the other proof techniques since they are usually also presented as honest-verifier protocols.)
A Σ-protocol is a proof system (P, V) where the conversation is of the form (a, c, z), where a and z are computed by P, and c is a challenge randomly chosen by V. The verifier accepts if φ(α, a, c, z) = 1 for some efficiently computable predicate φ. A Σ-protocol must satisfy three security requirements: correctness, special soundness and special honest-verifier zero knowledge (SHVZK). A Σ-protocol is correct when a honest prover convinces honest verifier with probability 1 − k −ω(1) . A Σ-protocol has the special soundness property when from two accepting views (a, c, z) and (a, c , z ), where c = c , one can efficiently recover a witness w such that w ⇒ x ∈ L. A Σ-protocol has the SHVZK property if there exists a PPT simulator Sim that can first randomly pick c * , z * (from some fixed sets) and then compute an a * such that the view (a * , c * , z * ) is accepting and the distribution (a * , c * , z * ) is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of accepting views between honest server and honest verifier.
We use the notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [CS97] for various zeroknowledge proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms and proofs of the validity of statements about discrete logarithms. For instance,
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Definition 2 (Range Proof [CCS08] ). A range proof with respect to a commitment scheme C is a special case of a proof of set membership in which the set Φ is a continuous sequence of integers Φ = [a, b] for a, b ∈ N.
As discussed in the introduction, some efficient range proofs were proposed in [Bou00,LAN02,Lip03,CCS08]. We will give a precise description of the proof from [CCS08] in Sect. 4.
Sumset-Representation of Integer Intervals
The goal of this section is to derive a sumset-representation 
and
This process stops when the interval [0, H j+1 ] is small enough so that it cannot be covered by u different non-empty intervals, that is, if H j+1 ≤ u − 1. Then we define (u, H) := j + 1 to be the number of steps in this recursive process. Clearly, after we are done with the recursive process,
This means in particular that if (u − 1) | H then H = 0. (Another, though non-recursive, example with H = 17 was already depicted by Fig. 1. ) Finally, the sequence (. . . , G j , . . . ) clearly decreases the slowest when for all j, u | (H j+1 + 1), since then the floor operation is not applied. But
Thus, the sequence is slowest to decrease if H + 1 = u for some . This means, that the process is guaranteed to stop in (u, H) ≤ log u (H + 1) steps.
This leads us to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let u ≥ 2, H ≥ u. Let G j , H j and H be defined as before. Denote = (u, H) ≤ log u (H + 1) as above.
Proof. Clear from above.
Semi-Closed Form for G j . While the presented recursive formulas for G j and H j+1 are efficient, it is desirable to to have a closed form for G j . In the next we show a semi-closed form, that is, a formula for G j that only depends on u, j and H.
Assume that H = h j u j with h j ∈ {0, . . . , u − 1}. For any j, write
Our proof is built up on the initial observation that
The latter equation is obvious: if
We can now prove that
Proof. By induction. We prove that H j = h (j+1)+ + j i=0 h i , from this the claim for G j is obvious. Induction basis (j = 0) is obvious since H 0 = h 0+ .
Induction step (j > 0). Assume that H
Thus to finish the proof we only have to show that
for any h i ∈ {0, . . . , u − 1}. We consider the next cases. 
In the binary case u = 2, a formula like this was already given in [LAN02] . However, while [LAN02] stated the closed form, they did not prove it. Fortunately, their formula follows straightforwardly from the general result.
Corollary 1 (Binary case, [LAN02]). If
Proof. Straightforward corollary.
Preliminaries: CCS Range Proof
Computational Assumptions. The following protocols require bilinear groups and associated hardness assumptions. These assumptions are summarized from [CCS08] . Let PG be a pairing group generator that on input 1 k outputs descriptions of multiplicative groups G 1 and G T of prime order p where |p| = k. Let G * 1 = G 1 \ {1} and let g ∈ G *
1 . The generated groups are such that there exists an admissible bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 1 → G T , meaning that (1) for all a, b ∈ Z p it holds that e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab ; (2) e(g, g) = 1; and (3) the bilinear map is efficiently computable.
Definition 3 (Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption [BB04] ). We say that the q-SDH assumption associated to a pairing generator PG holds if for all PPT adversaries A, the probability that A(g, g x , . . . , g
) where c ∈ Z p is negligible in k.
As noted by [CCS08] , Cheon's [Che06] attack against this type of assumption is not relevant if q ≤ 50 as it is in this protocol.
Boneh-Boyen Signatures. Our scheme relies on the elegant Boneh-Boyen short signature scheme [BB04] which we briefly summarize. The signer's secret key is x ← Z p , the corresponding public key is y = g x . The signature on a message m is σ ← g 1/(x+m) ; verification is done by checking that e(σ, y · g m ) = e(g, g). This scheme is similar to the Dodis and Yampolskiy verifiable random function [DY05] .
Security under weak chosen-message attack is defined through the following game. The adversary begins by outputting messages m 1 , . . . , m . The challenger generates a fresh key pair and gives the public key to the adversary, together with signatures σ 1 , . . . , σ on m 1 , . . . , m . The adversary wins if it succeeds in outputting a valid signature σ on a message m ∈ {m 1 , . . . , m }. The scheme is said to be unforgeable under a chosen-message attack if no p.p.t. adversary A has non-negligible probability of winning this game. Our scheme relies on the following property of the Boneh-Boyen short signature [BB04] which we paraphrase below:
Lemma 1 ( [BB04] ). Suppose the q-Strong Diffie Hellman assumption holds in (G 1 , G T ). Then the basic Boneh-Boyen signature scheme is q-secure against an existential forgery under a weak chosen message attack.
The Camenisch-Chaabouni-Shelat range proof in the case when H = u − 1 is depicted by Prot. 1. In particular, e : G 1 × G 1 → G T is an admissible bilinear map for some multiplicative groups G 1 , G T , and g is a generator of G 1 with h ∈ g .
Communication of CCS Range Proof for "Nice" H. The CCS range proof for nice H requires the prover to compute 3 exponentiations and 2 pairings (in [CCS08] , this was summed up as 5 exponentiations). It requires non-interactive (static) communication of NICom ccs (u, ) := (1 + u) · replen(G 1 ) ,
σju j . Common input: g, h, u, , and a commitment C. Prover's input: σ, r such that C = g σ h r and σ ∈ [0, H].
1. The verifier does: generate a random x ← Zp, and set y ← g
She sends (y, A0, . . . , Au−1) to the prover. 2. The prover does:
He sends (V0, . . . , V −1 ) to the verifier. 3. The prover uses the next Σ-protocol to prove to the verifier that C = h r · g σ j u j , and
(a) The prover picks sj, tj, mj
and aj = e(Vj, y) c · e(Vj, g)
Protocol 1: The CCS cryptographic range proof for range [0, u − 1].
bits (signatures and public keys that can be shared between different protocol runs), and interactive communication (which is unique for every protocol run) of
bits.
Communication of CCS for Arbitrary Range [L, H].
As noted in [CCS08] , to prove that σ ∈ [L, H] for arbitrary L and H, one can use an AND composition. More precisely, suppose that u
For this, one uses the standard AND composition of Prot. 1 with itself. Recall that an AND composition of two Σ-protocols A 1 and A 2 is a Σ protocol where the first message is a composition of the first messages of A 1 and A 2 , the second message is a single challenge c, and the third message is a composition of the third messages of A 1 and A 2 that correspond to the first messages and the single challenge c. Moreover, static information (the public key y and all signatures) and also the values V j are only sent once. Thus, in the AND composition of the CCS protocol, there are two versions of a j , D, z 
Remark on OR Composition.
[CCS08] also considered the OR composition. The communication of an OR composition is twice the communication of the single protocol, but with − 1 instead of , and thus the OR composition has the potential to be more efficient than the AND composition. In our case, for the OR composition to work, we have to assume that u is such that u
. This differs slightly from the misstated requirement of [CCS08] , where it was said that one just needs that u −1 < H. In particular, this means that the OR composition does not work for values, considered in Sect. 4.4 of [CCS08] , and thus the communication-efficiency of their range proof is (in most of the cases) slightly worse than claimed in [CCS08] .
Communication Analysis. Let us assume that replen(G T ) ≈ 12 * replen(G 1 ) ≈ replen(Z p ) [GPS08] . Following [CCS08] and plugging in parameters in terms of the replen(G 1 ), the communication can then be minimized by solving the following system min 6 + u + 29 s.t. u H Setting u = log H log log H then we get a total asymptotic communication complexity of Com(u, ) = O log H log log H − log log log H which is asymptotically smaller than O(log H). For concrete parameters, we substitute the constraint that u ≈ H into the equation u + above, set the derivative with respect to u to 0 and attempt to solve the equation:
which simplifies to u log 2 u = 29 log H.
This equation cannot be solved analytically. However, given H, we can use numerical methods to find a good u as described in [Bla97] .
Modified Range Proof: New
The idea of the next proof follows from Thm. 1. We can assume that u > 1. Clearly,
Theorem 3. Assuming the q-SDH assumption, Prot. 2 is correct and has the property of special soundness and SHVZK.
Proof (Sketch.). The proof is a straightforward extension of the security proof from [CCS08] .
Concrete Efficiency of New. Clearly, both the static and dynamic communication of New is related to communication of the CCS protocol in the next simple way:
This is easily seen to be a factor of 2 more efficient than having to use two proofs to handle an arbitrary range H.
Efficiency of New. Asymptotically, the total communication NICom New + ICom New of remains the same:
As before, this value is (approximately) minimized when we set u ← log 2 H log 2 log 2 H . Concretely, there is a factor of two difference. The communication can be minimized by solving min 4 + u + 15 such that > log u ((u − 1)(H + 1))
As mentioned before, in some cases when u − 1 already divides H, it is not necessary to multiply by u − 1; even when (u − 1) does not evenly divide H, a standard OR-proof can sometimes be used to handle H . We take this fact in account when computing the protocol's efficiency for a given range below. In the graph below, we show how the complexity of our new protocol compares with that of [CCS08] for ranges [0, H] where H varies from 1000 to 2 · 10 8 .
Comparison of Case Analysis
As a second way to compare the new protocol with protocol from [CCS08] and other previous work, we use the same numbers as in Sect. 4 of [CCS08] . In particular we assume that the size of G 1 is 256 bits, the size of G T is 3072 bits and the size of Z p is upper-bounded by 256 bits. We also use the range R = [L, H) = [347184000, 599644800) as in [CCS08] . Also, clearly, the new protocol (as is the CCS protocol) for R is exactly as efficient as protocol for range [0, H ], where H = H − L − 1. That is, H = 252460799. The values of NICom ccsand , ICom ccsand , NICom New and NICom New for a few different choices of u and are shown in the next two tables. Note that the optimal choice of u depends on how many times the range proof is going to be reused: the larger is the number w of reuses, the larger should be u, and for w reuses, one should choose a value of u for which NICom New (u, ) + (w − 1)ICom New (u, ) is minimal.
The values of NICom ccsand and ICom ccsand for some chosen values of u, are given below. (Here we only use the AND composition. As mentioned above, the OR composition is sometimes more efficient but only under certain restrictions.) The numbers in Tbl. 1 show that the CCS protocol is less efficient than claimed but still more efficient than the previous range proofs. Communication of New for some concrete choices of u and is given in Tbl. 2. Recall that we need to show that (u − 1)(σ + 1) − 1 ∈ [0, (u − 1)(H + 1)] = [0, 252460800(u − 1)]. We have calculated according to the point where the recursions of Thm. 1 end, and we note that sometimes its value differs from the predicted value log u ((u − 1)(H + 1)) . 
Conclusions
We showed that for any H and 1 < u < H, the interval [0, H] is equal to a sum G i * [0, u − 1] + [0, H ], where 0 ≤ H < H, and both u and are "small" in terms of H. We gave efficient (closed form) algorithms for computing the coefficients G i . This result may be interesting by itself in the context of additive combinatorics. We then used this decomposition to show how to derive efficient range proofs for arbitrary intervals [0, H]. Compared to the previous work [CCS08] , we thus avoided the use of AND composition of Σ-protocols. In addition, (1) we showed also that an earlier result from [LAN02] (that only considered the case u = 2) is correct, though it was left unproven in [LAN02] , and (2) we pointed out that the range proof from [CCS08] is (in most of the cases) less efficient than claimed there.
